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COVID-19	is	increasing	the	power	of	Brazil’s	criminal
groups
Data	from	various	states	suggest	that	COVID-19	lockdowns	have	done	little	to	reduce
the	use	of	violence	by	criminal	groups	in	Brazil.	What	has	changed	is	governance,	with
criminal	actors	adapting	to	coronavirus	by	imposing	curfews,	restricting	movement,
promoting	public-health	messages,	and	discouraging	price	gouging	–	alongside	their
usual	practices	of	extortion	and	drug	trafficking.	Such	changes	in	violence	and
governance	indicate	that	Brazil’s	non-state	armed	groups	continue	to	augment	their
power,	and	these	gains	may	well	persist	once	the	pandemic	has	receded,	write	Ryan	Berg	(American	Enterprise
Institute)	and	Andrea	Varsori	(Urban	Violence	Research	Network).
The	COVID-19	pandemic	has	shaken	the	world	and	paralysed	most	national	economies.	And	this	is	true	even	of
illicit	economies,	with	many	criminal	organisations	seeing	their	freedom	of	action	and	profits	squeezed	as	borders
close	worldwide.	Yet	the	pandemic	has	also	provided	some	non-state	actors	with	opportunities	to	augment	their
power,	as	the	case	of	Brazil	reveals.
A	mural	in	São	Paulo	depicting	Rio’s	Christ	the	Redeemer	statue	atop	a	mountain	of	guns	(mural	by
BLU,	detail	of	photo	by	Jack	Two,	CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
Violence	and	governance	as	proxies	of	power
The	growing	power	of	Brazil’s	criminal	groups	during	the	pandemic	can	best	be	viewed	through	two	lenses:
violence	and	governance.	Both	serve	as	excellent	proxies	for	the	power	of	criminal	groups	and,	fortunately,	both
are	measurable	despite	the	current	lockdown.
Levels	of	violence	serve	as	a	good	proxy	of	criminal	groups’	power	because	violence	is	an	essential	ingredient	of
their	claims	to	legitimacy.	Some	of	Brazil’s	criminal	groups,	such	as	the	Primeiro	Comando	da	Capital	(PCC,	First
Capital	Command)	have	the	capacity	to	influence	the	country’s	homicide	rates	due	to	their	control	over	sanctioning
of	murders	and	over	residents	views	on	what	constitutes	“legitimate”	use	of	force.
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While	the	control	exercised	by	Brazil’s	criminal	groups	is	periodically	enforced	by	violence	that	produces	fear	and
intimidation,	violence	is	also	useful	for	spreading	informal	governance	in	the	marginalised	areas	where	they
operate.	By	maintaining	a	monopoly	on	the	“legitimate”	use	of	violence,	Brazil’s	criminal	groups	shape	behavioural
norms	and	expectations.
Governance	serves	as	a	useful	proxy	because	Brazil’s	criminal	groups	often	dominate	neighbourhoods	in	the	urban
periphery	and	provide	governance	functions	in	communities	that	are	poorly	served	–	if	served	at	all	–	by	state
institutions.	In	normal	times,	they	might	mimic	states	and	provide	key	public	goods,	such	as	trash	collection	and
basic	infrastructure,	cable	TV	and	electricity	provision,	and	even	justice	and	policing	services.	In	an	example
suggestive	of	the	mutually	reinforcing	nature	of	violence	and	governance,	the	holding	of	criminal	tribunals	shows
how	armed	groups	can	ruthlessly	apply	disciplinary	power	through	a	literal	monopoly	on	violence.
Criminal	violence	under	lockdown	in	Brazil
With	respect	to	violence,	the	data	indicates	a	likely	increase	in	its	use	by	Brazil’s	criminal	groups	during	state-level
lockdowns,	as	seen	in	both	homicides	and	lethal	crimes	(a	broader	indicator	that	subsumes	homicides).	While	both
are	rough	indicators	of	criminal	violence,	a	rise	in	these	two	rates	makes	a	decrease	in	gang-related	murders
unlikely.
Members	of	the	Civil	Police	Special	Operations	Division	line-up	in	Brasilia	during	the	COVID-19
outbreak	(Renato	Alves/Agência	Brasília,	CC	BY	2.0)
In	most	Brazilian	states,	the	COVID-19	lockdown	started	around	mid-March.	Examining	homicide	and	lethal	crime
rates	for	the	month	of	April	is	therefore	the	best	option	when	analysing	trends	in	violence	under	anti-pandemic
measures.	While	several	important	states	have	yet	to	disclose	data	for	April,	figures	are	already	available	for	Ceará,
Rio	Grande	do	Norte,	and	Pernambuco.	The	governors	of	these	states	ordered	the	closure	of	all	non-essential
businesses	in	quick	succession	between	18	and	24	March.
In	Ceará	and	Rio	Grande	do	Norte,	a	decrease	in	the	number	of	lethal	crimes	in	March	(respectively	-21.8%	and	-
12.5%)	was	followed	by	an	increase	in	April	(+22%	and	+12.7%).	In	Pernambuco,	the	trend	has	been	the	opposite:
an	increase	in	March	(+22.4%)	followed	by	a	decrease	in	April	(-11.4%).	Nevertheless,	even	with	the	lockdown,
April	saw	more	lethal	crimes	than	February	(+8.5%),	as	well	as	slightly	more	than	April	2019.	Data	from	these
states	makes	a	decrease	in	gang-related	violence	unlikely.
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Notably,	in	the	aforementioned	states,	rival	criminal	groups	are	battling	for	control	of	criminal	markets	and	territory.
This	is	especially	the	case	in	Ceará,	where	drug	trafficking	routes	to	Europe	have	been	disputed	by	four	criminal
factions	since	the	mid-2010s.	Although	homicide	rates	fell	considerably	in	2019,	a	police	strike	in	February	led	to	a
spike	in	homicides.	A	new	spike	was	registered	in	April	2020,	during	the	lockdown.	More	specifically,	murders	have
been	clustered	in	the	poorer	peripheries	of	the	capital	Fortaleza,	where	inter-gang	violence	is	very	common.
Rio	de	Janeiro	state,	historically	beset	by	rivalries	amongst	criminal	factions	and	friction	with	police	paramilitary
groups,	also	saw	a	rise	in	recorded	homicides	in	March,	and	this	has	increase	has	been	linked	to	several	intense
turf	wars.	Between	March	13	and	April	9	alone,	turf	wars	have	been	reported	in	nine	different	areas,	eight	of	which
are	within	Rio’s	metropolitan	region.	Thus,	the	lockdown	does	not	seem	to	deter	the	use	of	violence	by	criminal
groups	where	longstanding	rivalries	exist.
Though	trends	vary	by	state,	COVID-19	appears	not	to	have	reduced	lethal	violence	in	Brazil	(Léu
Britto,	CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
Criminal	governance	under	lockdown	in	Brazil
With	respect	to	governance,	Brazil’s	criminal	groups	have	also	proven	to	be	nimble	and	adaptive	during	the
pandemic.	So	far,	they	have	imposed	curfews,	utilised	mobile	loudspeakers	to	broadcast	public-hygiene
announcements,	and	gone	door-to-door	to	ensure	compliance	with	quarantine	measures.	Criminal	factions	have
postponed	large	social	gatherings,	such	as	the	frequent	dance	parties	staged	for	local	entertainment.
Limited	state	presence	in	the	favelas	meant	that	the	then	Health	Minister	Luiz	Henrique	Mandetta	was	left	with	no
other	option	but	to	dialogue	with	criminal	groups	to	promote	public	health	and	negotiate	safe	passage	for	public
health	personnel.
In	a	sign	of	their	growing	power,	criminal	groups	have	distributed	personal	protective	equipment	and	repurposed
precursor	chemicals	used	in	the	production	of	drugs	to	manufacture	“hand	sanitiser”.	Criminal	factions	also
managed	to	steal	a	shipment	of	15,000	coronavirus	tests	and	2,000	units	of	personal	protective	equipment	from	an
airport	in	São	Paulo;	these	would	have	been	sold	and	distributed	had	they	not	been	recovered	by	Brazilian
authorities.	Criminal	factions	in	Rio	favelas	such	as	Rocinha	and	Vidigal	are	effectively	prohibiting	entry	to
outsiders,	which	serves	both	to	slow	transmission	of	the	virus	and	also	to	maintain	the	gangs’	socioeconomic	role
as	providers.	In	the	face	of	scarcity,	Brazilian	criminal	groups	have	sought	to	control	the	price	of	goods	on	the	open
market	by	threatening	violence	against	vendors	to	prevent	price	gouging.
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That	said,	the	factions’	daily	bread	of	extortion	continues	in	all	of	its	usual	forms,	as	does	the	trafficking	of	drugs.
Despite	coronavirus-induced	trade	disruptions,	Brazil’s	criminal	groups	continue	to	export	illicit	narcotics	to	their	top
destination,	Europe,	and	seizures	are	up	20	per	cent	this	year	when	compared	to	the	same	period	of	last	year.	The
isolation	and	anxiety	associated	with	social	distancing	measures	have	also	led	to	increased	international	demand
for	illicit	narcotics,	with	widespread	panic	buying	despite	rising	prices.
Finally,	the	pandemic	has	augmented	the	governance	power	of	criminal	groups	in	another	critical	domain:	prisons.
Many	of	Brazil’s	top	criminal	groups	are	based	in	prisons,	with	top	leaders	incarcerated	and	the	prison	experience
remaining	central	to	group	identity.
Even	in	normal	times,	criminal	groups	fill	the	gaps	in	the	state’s	paltry	delivery	of	essential	goods	and	services
throughout	the	country’s	decrepit	prison	facilities,	and	they	have	leveraged	their	power	even	further	during	the
pandemic.	With	the	virus	spreading	rapidly	through	overcrowded	jails	and	normal	rights	(like	visiting	hours)	often
being	curtailed,	criminal	groups	have	gone	so	far	as	to	take	prison	guards	hostage	in	order	to	demand	better
conditions,	sometimes	even	leading	massive	prison	escapes.
Overall,	COVID-19	has	given	Brazil’s	criminal	groups	a	new	swagger.	Trends	in	violence	and	criminal	governance
indicate	that	Brazil’s	non-state	armed	groups	continue	to	augment	their	power,	and	these	gains	may	well	endure
once	the	pandemic	recedes.	When	the	country	reopens	completely,	state	and	federal	authorities	are	likely	to
encounter	a	highly	altered	landscape	in	which	they	have	lost	considerable	ground	in	their	fight	against	criminal
factions.
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